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Sehen ist eine vermeintlich objektive Form der Wahr- 
nehmung. Allerdings sieht der Mensch immer nur 
einzelne Aspekte eines Ganzen und deutet diese – 
gedanklich oder mit Worten – auf eine subjektive 
Weise. Ziel des vorgestellten Projekts ist es, Sehens- 
und Benennungsgewohnheiten bewusst zu machen 
und zu durchbrechen.
Seeing is a supposedly objective form of perception. 
However, people only ever see individual aspects of a 
whole and interpret them – menatlly or in words –  
in a subjective way. The aim of the project presented 
here is to make people aware of their habits of  









































































A democratic society necessarily has to strive towards a balance between 
individual and collective values. Competence in aspectual thinking is a 
tool for a better understanding of human communication and the interac-
tions between people and images, i.e., of the ‘world’. As Erving Goffman 
has pointed out, we can generate a desired world, when we understand 
how to deal with multiple realities. Empathy presupposes the faculty to 
imagine oneself in the place of others. Therefore this competence – the 
ability to deal with different perspectives, to think aspectually – has an 
aesthetic, an ethical and a social impact.
In the society we live in today, there is much concern about the 
changing role of images ( online, as selfie, as newsfeed, as commercial ). 
The changes in how we produce, use, distribute and comment on images 
directly affect our worldview.1 Philosophers and artists face the task of 
having to bring some kind of orientation to this complex field so as to take 
away the feelings of anxiety that could arise when we do not know our way 
about. If we can get a better view of mechanisms of understanding and 
the creation of meaning – connecting the fields of cognition, poetics and 
artistic practice in a comprehensible pattern – then we can also provide 
protection against the manipulative use of the text-image relationship in 
advertising and in the production of published ‘facts’. In schools, univer-
sities and research institutes, such expertise should be common know-
ledge. No one with responsibilities towards clients, students or colleagues 
in research or the production of meanings should ignore the broad impact 
that aspectual thinking has on the world as we perceive it. Aspectual 
seeing is the shared competence that accommodates social cohesion and 
difference at the same time. Altered, versatile perspectives allow for new 
“ways of seeing”, and for fresh, creative modes of understanding.2 This 
can find many applications, also in teaching situations, art education and 
academic discourse.
The precise ways in which we are entangled in our organised 
activities – such as interactions with images, meaning-creation and mu-
tual understanding, etc. – are different for everyone.3 It is hardly surprising 
that the way out of our confusion is equally different for everyone.
Looking for meaning is a focal human drive, and the quest for 
signification is a reflexive force. Seeing is never passive but a complex 
practice involving perception, interaction and engagement. What is seen – 
what the viewer is aware of – is the fruit of a small epiphany, a sudden insight 
at the close of multi-layered, active processes.4
What we will begin to see is that there is never only one way of 
seeing, never only one right way of picturing what we see. This is what 
aspect-seeing highlights in every instance. It is the invisible facilitator of 
understanding and of making oneself understood ; it is a valuable human 
cultural tool. We simply have to understand it and use it properly. It is the 
bliss of understanding.
Aspect Change
Aspect-seeing, a term introduced by Ludwig Wittgenstein, is a fundamen-
tal cognitive instrument, and vital in this context.5 Aspect change, syn- 
onymous with the practice of aspect-seeing and aspectual thinking, can 
happen as a sudden shift, or as a gradual process of shifting between 
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interpretations or perceptions. Meanings can tip over abruptly like in jokes, 
but images – as objects perceived through our practice of seeing – can 
also shift smoothly, little by little, and unnoticed. Rhetorical shifts in 
language, a metaphorical transfer or interaction between image and text, 
can provide examples of when and how we undergo such shifts.6
On the most basic level, we know aspect change as a phenomenon from 
Gestalt theory. We recognise Kippbilder and picture puzzles as games of 
visual perception, and we are familiar with 2D/3D representations such 
as the Necker cube, or cartoons of multi-representational images. 
In ordinary language, we speak of an aspect to point out our 
visual focus or our viewpoint. The processes of how to see an aspect and 
its impact on perception as such ( in art and beyond ), remain unnoticed. 
Fundamental processes in perception and cognition are often overlooked, 
as they constantly accompany and facilitate our senses. As Ludwig Witt-
genstein said, one tends to ignore what is “before one’s eyes” : “The aspects 
of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their sim-
plicity and familiarity. ( One is unable to notice something – because it is 
always before one’s eyes. )”7 
During the process of aspect change, a shift of meaning occurs and the 
perceived object is experienced in a new way, without it really changing. 
The objects that change under the influence of aspect-seeing are what we 
call shifting images.8 A familiar example for this is the duck-rabbit pic-
ture.9 Some see it as a duck at first, others as a rabbit, but none of us is 
wrong.
The trivial, but crucial, issue with this picture is that every act 
of perception is already an interpretation ; our perception and assessment 
of the world change with the way we represent things, with our worldview. 
The duck-rabbit picture suggests that we often do not notice 
certain aspects of the world, and fail to see what others cannot miss. As 
Wittgenstein said, “[ a ] picture held us captive”.10 Especially when philoso- 
phers conjure up their universal theories on the basis of their private 
perspectives, this becomes an invitation for misunderstandings. 
It was Wittgenstein’s aim to break free of this captivity by point-
ing to different possibilities of interpretation time and again. Emphasising 
now this aspect of the world and now that one, he wanted to show his 
readers that almost every theory up to now has been too dogmatic ; more 
generally, that no way of representing the world is capable of capturing all 
possible aspects. There is no single, right mode of representation, just as 
there is not one right way of interpreting the duck-rabbit picture. In light 
of this, the task of the philosopher is to complicate misleading, one-di-
mensional representations by re-describing the world from ever-new 
perspectives. In other words, our constant task is to bring about aspect 
changes. Aspect change is a tool we need to transfer our viewpoints into 
a whole spectrum of meanings, rather than to believe in one truth.
I know that the crucial term ‘real’ may have been permanent-
ly Wittgensteined into a blur of slightly different uses, but 
proceed on the assumption that carefulness can gradually 




It is in pictures like that of the duck-rabbit that concept and image come 
together through interpretation.12 We shift the image we see until it clicks 
with the concept that must belong to it. “Now I see a rabbit !”, we exclaim, 
heaving a sigh of relief. Indeed, aspect-seeing is “half visual experience, 
half thought”.13 What we see differs with the attitude we adopt toward the 
objects perceived.14 This often demands imagination.15
Aspect change can thus best be experienced in the gaps be-
tween saying and showing. Switching modes of perception gives us a view 
of the simultaneity of competing aspects, competing ways of seeing. For 
example, in Frans Oosterhof’s work Plaatsbepaling ( Positioning ), made in 
1994, we see a young couple holding hands in a clearing of a thick forest. 
We see a car hiding behind a tree. Capitalised words are arranged clock-
wise : the meeting, the border, the picnic, the trap, the farewell, the rope. 
The interpretation of the image is charged differently by each one of the 
‘subtitles’ – the viewer experiences aspect change as a variety of possible 
meanings.16
The recent work of the artist duo Hänni & Schenk ( HKB 2017 ) exemplifies 
this method : their work Echo is a series of 50 dishes made of porcelain 
that retain the traces of a meal by annealing the enamel after the food was 
on the plate. The work hosts a discourse on Gestalt phenomena ( What do 
I identify ? Is it a galaxy ? A globe ? Spaghetti ? ), it alludes to the tradition-
al role of tableware as representational currency and the political superi-
ority of wealthy citizens and royals represented in the dinnerware, and 
is a visual power statement. It refers to cultural heritage, ‘China’ as well 
as Dutch, or to Swiss craft and customs. And seen from another aspect, 
it reveals a fleeting, daily, often social, human practice of having meals 
together. 
Jokes
Many jokes can be seen as instances of the phenomenon of aspect change 
( which is why it makes sense to speak of aspectual or shifting jokes ). 
Laughter and aspect changes are often accompanied by a pleasurable 
state of relief or elation. Sigmund Freud made explicit this connection 
between humour and perspectival shifts.
What Freud calls the joke-technique of “double meaning” or 
“plays upon words” is analogous to Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit picture.17 
The following joke is cited by Freud as a clear example of a shifting joke :
A doctor, as he came away from a lady’s bedside, said to  
her husband with a shake of his head : “I don’t like her looks”. 
“I’ve not liked her looks for a long time”, the husband has-
tened to agree.18
Just as the duck-rabbit picture is one image with two interpretations, in 
this joke the same word is interpreted in two different ways. Neither the 
image nor the word changes, yet they take on a different meaning according 
to the different ways in which we represent them. Upon being struck by 
the playfulness of an ambiguity that falls into place, a dose of pent-up 
mental energy escapes and we feel relieved.
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Aha !
Generally, the triggers and effects of ‘aha’ moments can reveal crucial 
facets of mental shifts : understanding a joke and getting the pun releas-
es a set of reactions related to basic subconscious biological mechanisms, 
and neurochemical processes influence perception.19 Our desire to get the 
pun shows how we as humans strive to discover hidden aspects. Under-
standing creates bliss. The exemplary collaborative work between the 
literary scholar and poet Raoul Schrott and the cognitive scientist Arthur 
Jacobs focuses on the transfer zones between cognitive processes and 
poetic procedures. They connect perspectives from poetics, aesthetics 
and rhetoric to cognitive processes in order to explain semantic shifts in 
image perception. Aspectual thinking is presented as an operational mode 
of the brain, which is linked to the ‘aha’ experience and mental shifts 
between figures of perception.20 Cognitive processes and neuronal patterns 
prove to have a physiological and biochemical component.21 The pleasure 
of understanding an image, text or a joke thus generates a state of elation, 
as it is exciting, playful and satisfying.22 This is an effect we want to map 
onto artistic practice and research by distinguishing it from current views 
on the productive role of wit in the arts.23
[ ... ] the enabling concept here being that of defamiliarization 
or making strange ( ostranenie ), the ability of the artistic  
construct to slow down perception and make the audience 
see the object in question as if for the first time.24
The theoretical concept of this focuses on a blind spot in our lives : the 
way we ‘see’ the world essentially is the way the world is to us. Seeing as 
both metaphor and physical experience covers almost all instances 
in which we find ourselves being in the world. Erving Goffman lays the 
foundation for a theoretical realm of aspect-seeing in Frame Analysis 
( 1974 ), where he examines organisations in relation to ‘reality’ in socio-
cultural terms of actions and their meanings and consequences. Taking 
his cue from Alfred Schütz,25 Goffman argues for “[ ... ] multiple realities 
[ ... ] to look for rules which, when followed, allow us to generate a ‘world’ 
of a given kind.”26
“Bracketing” and “framing” describe modes in which individ-
uals deal with and regulate “optical” and conceptual effects of framing, 
including “fraud, deceit, misidentification”.27 Goffman establishes con-
cepts of “slippage and looseness” in opposition to the belief “that the 
world can be totally perceived”,28 and claims that “a primary framework 
is one that is seen as rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless 
aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful.”29 
Practice
We largely share similar physical set-ups and use similar institutions, which 
influence the way we organise space around us.30 Our experiences influ-
ence our mind and language, and metaphors take off when they success-
fully transfer different experiential zones into our habits and worldviews. 
When we look at our linguistic habits, we can detect such hidden world-
views. Look at the way we describe the sunset in different languages : 
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‘Sonnenuntergang’, ‘coucher de soleil’, ‘il tramonto’. Its name reveals one 
aspect, from our respective subjective viewpoint.
Wittgenstein remarked that we often get inextricably caught 
up in the constructions and organisations that make up our everyday lives. 
Language is one such a construction, images are another, dancing a third, 
and so on. Each of these practices can be seen as a multi-layered game 
with rules and strategies that have become increasingly complex, and for 
which we now lack a comprehensive overview. Sometimes we get lost in 
them, and we do not know how to play on.
Here the fundamental fact is that we lay down rules, a tech-
nique, for playing a game, and that then, when we follow  
the rules, things don’t turn out as we had assumed. So that 
we are, as it were, entangled in our own rules. This entan- 
glement in our rules is what we want to understand : that is, 
to survey.31 
This is exactly what we want to practice : continuing to play these all-too-
familiar games of image-interpretation with words, but this time with 
awareness and clarity. To this end, we want to understand the rules and 
techniques of our daily aspectual practices, and we want to invent a way 
of presenting those rules in a perspicuous manner so that everyone else 
is able to grasp them as well.
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